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Complex networks such as the sexual partnership web or the Internet often show a high degree of
redundancy and heterogeneity in their connectivity properties. This peculiar connectivity provides
an ideal environment for the spreading of infective agents. Here we show that the random uniform
immunization of individuals does not lead to the eradication of infections in all complex networks.
Namely, networks with scale-free properties do not acquire global immunity from major epidemic
outbreaks even in the presence of unrealistically high densities of randomly immunized individuals.
The absence of any critical immunization threshold is due to the unbounded connectivity fluctuations
of scale-free networks. Successful immunization strategies can be developed only by taking into
account the inhomogeneous connectivity properties of scale-free networks. In particular, targeted
immunization schemes, based on the nodes’ connectivity hierarchy, sharply lower the network’s
vulnerability to epidemic attacks.
PACS numbers: 89.75.-k, 87.23.Ge, 05.70.Ln
I. INTRODUCTION
The relevance of spatial and other kinds of heterogene-
ity in the design of immunization strategies has been
widely addressed in the epidemic modeling of infectious
diseases [1, 2]. In particular, it has been pointed out
that population inhomogeneities can substantially en-
hance the spread of diseases, making them harder to
eradicate and calling for specific immunization strategies.
This issue assumes the greatest importance in a wide
range of natural interconnected systems such as food-
webs, communication and social networks, metabolic and
neural systems [3, 4]. The complexity of these networks
resides in the small average path lengths among any two
nodes (small-world property), along with a large degree
of local clustering. In other words, some special nodes
of the structure develop a larger probability to establish
connections pointing to other nodes. This feature has
dramatic consequences in the topology of scale-free (SF)
networks [5, 6, 7] which exhibit a power-law distribution
P (k) ∼ k−γ (1)
for the probability that any node has k connections to
other nodes. For exponents in the range 2 < γ ≤ 3, this
connectivity distribution implies that, for large network
sizes, the nodes have a statistically significant probability
of having a very large number of connections compared to
the average connectivity, 〈k〉. This feature contrasts with
what is found for homogeneous networks (local or non-
local) in which each node has approximately the same
number of links, k ≃ 〈k〉 [8, 9]. The extreme hetero-
geneity of SF networks finds the most stunning examples
in two artificial systems, the World-Wide-Web (WWW)
[5, 10] and the Internet [6, 11, 12]. Along with these
technological networks, it has also been pointed out that
sexual partnership networks are often extremely hetero-
geneous [1, 13, 14], and it has been recently observed
that the network of sexual human contacts possesses a
well-defined scale-free nature [15].
In homogeneous networks, an epidemic occurs only if
the rate of infection of “healthy” individuals connected
to infected ones exceeds the so-called epidemic threshold;
in other words, if the disease cannot transmit itself faster
than the time of cure, it dies out [1, 2]. In heterogeneous
networks, on the other hand, it is well-known that the
epidemic threshold decreases with the standard devia-
tion of the connectivity distribution [1]. This feature is
paradoxically amplified in scale-free networks which have
diverging connectivity fluctuations. In fact, as it was first
noted in Refs. [16, 17], epidemic processes in SF networks
do not possess, in the limit of an infinite network, an epi-
demic threshold below which diseases cannot produce a
major epidemic outbreak or the inset of an endemic state.
SF networks are therefore prone to the spreading and the
persistence of infections, whatever virulence the infective
agent might possess.
In view of this weakness, it becomes a major task to
find optimal immunization strategies oriented to mini-
mize the risk of epidemic outbreaks on SF networks, task
with immediate practical and economical implications.
This paper presents a parallel comparison of the effect
of different immunization schemes in the case of two dif-
ferent complex networks: the Watts-Strogatz model [9]
and the Baraba´si and Albert model [5]. The first is a
homogeneous network exhibiting small-world properties,
while the second one is the prototype example of SF net-
work. By studying the susceptible-infected-susceptible
model [2] in presence of progressively greater immuniza-
tion rates, we find that uniformly applied immunization
strategies are effective only in complex networks with
bounded connectivity fluctuations. On the contrary, in
SF networks the infection is not eradicated even in the
presence of an unrealistically high fraction of immunized
individuals. Actually, SF systems do not have any crit-
2ical fraction of immunized individuals and only the to-
tal immunization of the network achieves the infection’s
eradication. In order to overcome these difficulties we
define optimal immunization strategies that rely on the
particular SF structure of the network. The developed
strategies allow us to achieve the total protection of the
network even for extremely low fractions of successfully
immunized individuals.
II. THE MODEL
In order to estimate the effect of an increasing density
of immune individuals in complex networks, we will inves-
tigate the standard susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS)
model [2]. This model relies on a coarse-grained descrip-
tion of individuals in the population. Namely, each node
of the graph represents an individual and each link is a
connection along which the infection can spread. Each
susceptible (healthy) node is infected with rate ν if it is
connected to one or more infected nodes. Infected nodes
are cured and become again susceptible with rate δ, defin-
ing an effective spreading rate λ = ν/δ (without lack of
generality, we set δ = 1). The SIS model does not take
into account the possibility of individuals’ removal due
to death or acquired immunization [2], and thus individ-
uals run stochastically through the cycle susceptible →
infected → susceptible. This model is generally used to
study infections leading to endemic states with a station-
ary average density of infected individuals.
A. Homogeneous complex networks
A wide class of network models [8, 9] have exponen-
tially bounded connectivity fluctuations. A paradigmatic
example of this kind of networks that has recently at-
tracted a great deal of attention is the Watts-Strogatz
(WS) model [9], which is constructed as follows: The
starting point is a ring with N nodes, in which each node
is symmetrically connected with its 2K nearest neigh-
bors. Then, for every node each link connected to a
clockwise neighbor (thus K links for each node) is kept
as originating from the original node and rewired to a
randomly chosen target node with probability p. This
procedure generates a random graph with a connectiv-
ity distributed exponentially for large k, and an average
connectivity 〈k〉 = 2K. It is worth remarking that even
in the case p = 1 the network keeps the memory of the
construction algorithm and is not equivalent to a random
graph. In fact, by definition each node emanates at least
the K links which have been rewired from the clockwise
neighbors to randomly chosen nodes; a property that af-
fects also the clustering properties of the graph (for de-
tails see Ref. [18]).
For the class of exponentially bounded networks, one
can generally consider that each node has roughly the
same number of links, k ≃ 〈k〉, and therefore we can con-
sider them as fairly homogeneous in their connectivity
properties. At a mean-field level, the equation describ-
ing the time evolution of the average density of infected
individuals ρ(t) (prevalence) is
dρ(t)
dt
= −ρ(t) + λ 〈k〉 ρ(t) [1− ρ(t)] . (2)
The mean-field character of this equation stems from
the fact that we have neglected the density correlations
among the different nodes, independently of their re-
spective connectivities. The first term on the r.h.s. in
Eq. (2) considers infected nodes becoming healthy with
unit rate. The second term represents the average density
of newly infected nodes generated by each active node.
This is proportional to the infection spreading rate λ,
the number of links emanating from each node k ≃ 〈k〉,
and the probability that a given link points to a healthy
node, [1− ρ(t)]. After imposing the stationary condition
dρ(t)/dt = 0, the most significant and general result is
the existence of a nonzero epidemic threshold λc = 〈k〉
−1
[2] such that
ρ = 0 if λ < λc, (3)
ρ ∼ λ− λc if λ ≥ λc. (4)
In other words, if the value of λ is above the threshold,
λ ≥ λc, the infection spreads and becomes endemic. Be-
low it, λ < λc, the infection dies out exponentially fast.
The existence of an epidemic threshold is a general re-
sults in epidemic modeling, present also in different mod-
els such as the susceptible-infected-removed (SIR) model
[2]. In analogy with critical phenomena [19], this kind
of behavior can be identified as an absorbing-state phase
transition, in which ρ plays the role of the order parame-
ter in the phase transition and λ is the tuning parameter,
recovering the usual mean-field behavior [19].
B. Scale-free networks
This standard framework is radically changed in the
class of SF networks [16, 17], in which the probability
distribution that a node has k connections has the form
P (k) ∼ k−γ and the connectivity fluctuations,
〈
k2
〉
, di-
verge in infinite networks for any value 2 < γ ≤ 3. The
paradigmatic example of SF network is the Baraba´si and
Albert (BA) model [5]. The construction of the BA
graph starts from a small number m0 of disconnected
nodes; every time step a new vertex is added, with m
links that are connected to an old node i with probabil-
ity Π(ki) = ki/
∑
j kj , where ki is the connectivity of the
i-th node. After iterating this scheme a sufficient num-
ber of times, we obtain a network composed by N nodes
with connectivity distribution P (k) ∼ k−3 and average
connectivity 〈k〉 = 2m. For this class of graphs, the ab-
sence of a characteristic scale for the connectivity makes
highly connected nodes statistically significant, and in-
duces strong fluctuations in the connectivity distribution
3which cannot be neglected. In order to take into account
these fluctuations, we have to relax the homogeneity as-
sumption used for homogeneous networks, and consider
the relative density ρk(t) of infected nodes with given
connectivity k; i.e., the probability that a node with k
links is infected. The dynamical mean-field equations
can thus be written as [16, 17]
dρk(t)
dt
= −ρk(t) + λk [1− ρk(t)] Θ(ρ(t)), (5)
where also in this case we have considered a unity recov-
ery rate. The creation term considers the probability that
a node with k links is healthy [1− ρk(t)] and gets the in-
fection via a connected node. The probability of this last
event is proportional to the infection rate λ, the number
of connections k, and the probability Θ(ρ(t)) that any
given link points to an infected node. The probability
that a link points to a node with s links is proportional
to sP (s). In other words, a randomly chosen link is more
likely to be connected to an infected node with high con-
nectivity, yielding
Θ(ρ(t)) =
∑
k kP (k)ρk(t)∑
s sP (s)
, (6)
where
∑
s sP (s) is identical to 〈k〉 by definition. In the
stationary state [dρk(t)/dt = 0], Eq. (5) yields the fol-
lowing infected node density form
ρk =
λkΘ
1 + λkΘ
. (7)
By inserting the above expression for ρk in Eq. (6), we
obtain the self-consistency equation
Θ =
1
〈k〉
∑
k
kP (k)
λkΘ
1 + λkΘ
, (8)
where Θ is now a function of λ alone [16, 17]. The solu-
tion Θ = 0 is always satisfying the consistency equation.
A non-zero stationary prevalence (ρk 6= 0) is obtained
when the r.h.s. and the l.h.s. of Eq. (8), expressed as
function of Θ, cross in the interval 0 < Θ ≤ 1, allow-
ing a nontrivial solution. It is easy to realize that this
corresponds to the inequality
d
dΘ
(
1
〈k〉
∑
k
kP (k)
λkΘ
1 + λkΘ
)∣∣∣∣∣
Θ=0
≥ 1 (9)
being satisfied. The value of λ yielding the equality in
Eq. (9) defines the critical epidemic threshold λc, that is
given by∑
k kP (k)λck
〈k〉
=
〈
k2
〉
〈k〉
λc = 1 ⇒ λc =
〈k〉
〈k2〉
. (10)
This results implies that in SF networks with connectiv-
ity exponent 2 < γ ≤ 3, for which
〈
k2
〉
→ ∞, we have
λc = 0. This fact implies in turn that for any positive
value of λ the infection can pervade the system with a
finite prevalence, in a sufficiently large network [16, 17].
For small λ it is possible to solve explicitly Eq. (8) for
SF networks and calculate the prevalence in the endemic
state as ρ =
∑
k P (k)ρk as shown in Refs. [16, 17].
Calculations can be carried out by using the continu-
ous k approximation, valid for large k [20], that assumes
〈kn〉 =
∫∞
m
knP (k)dk, where m is the minimum num-
ber of connections of any node and P (k) is a properly
defined probability density of connections. For the par-
ticular case of the BA network we have P (k) = 2m2k−3
[5], that in the limit of an infinitely large network yields
the prevalence [16, 17]
ρ ≃ 2 exp(−1/mλ). (11)
Obviously,
〈
k2
〉
assumes a bounded value in finite
size networks, defining an effective threshold λc(N) > 0
due to finite size effects, as customarily encountered in
nonequilibrium phase transitions [19]. This epidemic
threshold, however, is not an intrinsic quantity as in
exponential networks and it is vanishing for increasing
network sizes; i.e. in the thermodynamic limit. Since
real networks have always a finite size, however, it is in-
teresting to calculate how the epidemic threshold scales
with the system size [21]. By considering the continu-
ous k approximation, it is possible to calculate the fi-
nite size distribution moments as 〈kn〉 =
∫ kc
m
knP (k)dk,
where kc is the largest connectivity present in the fi-
nite network. For networks composed by N nodes, kc
is obviously an increasing function of N . In the particu-
lar case of the BA model, we readily obtain 〈k〉 ≃ 2m
and
〈
k2
〉
≃ 2m2 ln(kc/m) as kc → ∞. Substitut-
ing this values in the Eq. (10) we obtain a threshold
λc ≃ (m ln(kc/m))
−1. In order to find the size depen-
dence of λc, we have to relate the maximum connectivity
kc with the network size N . This relation is given by
kc ≃ mN
1/2 [20, 22], yielding finally a threshold
λc(N) =
〈k〉
〈k2〉
∼
1
ln(N)
. (12)
This result can be generalized to SF networks with an
arbitrary connectivity distribution, which show an epi-
demic threshold vanishing as a power law behavior in N
with an exponent depending on the connectivity expo-
nent γ [23].
III. UNIFORM IMMUNIZATION STRATEGY
The simplest immunization procedure one can consider
consists in the random introduction of immune individu-
als in the population [1], in order to get a uniform immu-
nization density. Immune nodes cannot become infected
and thus do not transmit the infection to their neigh-
bors. In this case, for a fixed spreading rate λ, the rele-
vant control parameter is the immunity g, defined as the
fraction of immune nodes present in the network. At the
4mean-field level, the presence of uniform immunity will
effectively reduce the spreading rate λ by a factor (1−g);
i.e. the probability of finding and infecting a susceptible
and non-immune node. By substituting λ→ λ(1 − g) in
Eqs. (2) and (5) we obtain the prevalence behavior for
progressively larger immunization rates.
In homogeneous networks, such as the WS model, it
is easy to show that in the case of a constant λ, the
stationary prevalence obtained from Eq. (2) is given by
ρ = 0 if g > gc , (13)
ρ ∼ gc − g if g ≤ gc . (14)
Here, gc is the critical immunization value above which
the density of infected individuals in the stationary state
is null and depends on λ as
gc =
λ− λc
λ
. (15)
Thus, the critical immunization which achieves eradica-
tion is related to the spreading rate and the epidemic
threshold of the infection. Eq. (15) is obviously valid
only for λ > λc, and it implies that the critical immu-
nization allowing the complete protection of the network
(null prevalence) is increasing with the spreading rate λ.
On the contrary, uniform immunization strategies on
SF networks are totally ineffective. The presence of
immunization depresses the infection’s prevalence too
slowly, and it is impossible to find any critical fraction of
immunized individuals that ensures the infection eradi-
cation. The absence of an epidemic threshold (λc = 0) in
the thermodynamic limit implies that whatever rescaling
λ→ λ(1−g) of the spreading rate does not eradicate the
infection except the case g = 1. In fact, by using Eq. (10)
we have that the immunization threshold is given by
1− gc =
1
λ
〈k〉
〈k2〉
. (16)
In SF networks with
〈
k2
〉
→ ∞ only a complete immu-
nization of the network (i.e., gc = 1) ensures an infection-
free stationary state. The fact that uniform immuniza-
tion strategies are less effective has been noted in several
cases of spatial heterogeneity [1]. In SF networks we face
a limiting case due to the extremely high (virtually in-
finite) heterogeneity in connectivity properties. Also in
this case finite networks present an effective threshold
gc(N) depending on the number of nodes N . As for the
epidemic threshold, however, we are not in presence of
an intrinsic quantity and we have that gc(N)→ 1 in the
thermodynamic limit N → ∞. In the case of the BA
model, inserting the expression (12) into Eq. (16), we
observe that the immunization threshold scales as
1− gc(N) ∼
1
λ ln(N)
. (17)
Also in this case it is possible to generalize this result for
arbitrary connectivity exponents γ [23].
In order to provide further support to the present
mean-field (sometimes called the deterministic approxi-
mation) description, we study by means of numerical sim-
ulations the behavior of the SIS model on the WS and the
BA networks. In these systems, because of the nonlocal
connectivity, mean-field predictions are expected to cor-
rectly depict the model’s behavior. In the present work
we consider the parameters K = 3 and maximal disorder
p = 1 for the WS network, and m0 = 5 and m = 3 in the
case of the BA network.
In the presence of uniform immunization, we can study
the system by looking at the infection’s prevalence in the
stationary regime (endemic state) as a function of the im-
munity g. The uniform immunization is implemented by
randomly selecting and immunizing gN nodes on a net-
work of fixed size N . Our simulations are implemented
at a fixed spreading rate λ = 0.25. The number of nodes
range from N = 104 to N = 106. We analyze the sta-
tionary properties of the density of infected nodes ρg (the
infection prevalence) for different values of the immuniza-
tion g. Initially we infect half of the susceptible nodes
in the network, and iterate the rules of the SIS model
with parallel updating. The prevalence is computed av-
eraging over at least 100 different starting configurations,
performed on at least 10 different realizations of the net-
work. In Fig. 1(a), we show the behavior of the reduced
prevalence ρg/ρ0 (where ρ0 is the prevalence without im-
munization) as a function of the uniform immunization
g in the WS network. We observe that the prevalence
of infected nodes decays drastically for increasing im-
munization densities (see Fig. 1(b)). In particular, we
observe the presence of a sharp immunization threshold
gc ≃ 0.385, in fair agreement with the estimate gc ≃ 0.36
from Eq. (15) with the values λ = 0.25 and the estimate
λc ≃ 0.16 from Ref. [17]. In the biological case, this ef-
fect motivates the use of global vaccination campaigns in
homogeneous populations in order to reach a density of
immune individuals that secures from major outbreaks or
endemic states. On the contrary, the results for the SF
network, depicted in Fig. 2(a), show a strikingly different
behavior. Namely, the density of infected individuals de-
cays slowly with increasing immunization, and it would
be null only for the complete immunization of the whole
network (g = 1). Specifically, it follows from Eq. (11)
that the SIS model on the BA network shows for g ≃ 1
and any λ the prevalence
ρg ≃ 2 exp(−1/mλ(1− g)) (18)
We have checked this prediction in Fig. 2(b). In other
words, the infection always reaches an endemic state if
the network size is enough large (see Fig. 3(a)). This
points out the absence of an immunization threshold; SF
networks are weak in face of infections, also after massive
uniform vaccination campaigns.
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FIG. 1: a) Reduced prevalence ρg/ρ0 from computer simulations of the SIS model in the WS network with uniform and targeted
immunization at a fixed spreading rate λ = 0.25. Extrapolation of the linear behavior of ρg for the largest immunization values
yields an estimate of the critical immunity gc ≃ 0.385. b) Typical plots of ρg(t) as a function of time, averaged over 100 starting
configurations, for the SIS model in WS networks with uniform immunization, for different values of g. From top to bottom:
g = 0.1, 0.14, 0.35, and 0.43. For the last value of g (above the critical immunization) all runs die, independently of the network
size N .
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FIG. 2: a) Reduced prevalence ρg/ρ0 from computer simulations of the SIS model in the BA network with uniform and targeted
immunization, at a fixed spreading rate λ = 0.25. A linear extrapolation from the largest values of g yields an estimate of
the threshold gc ≃ 0.16 in BA networks with targeted immunization. b) Check of the predicted functional dependence
ρg ∼ exp(−1/mλ(1− g)) for the SIS model in the BA network with uniform immunization.
IV. OPTIMIZED IMMUNIZATION
STRATEGIES
When fighting an epidemic in an heterogeneous popu-
lation with a uniform vaccination scheme, it is necessary
to vaccinate a fraction of the population larger than the
estimate given by a simple (homogeneous) assumption
[1]. In this case, it can be proved [1] that optimal vacci-
nation programs can eradicate the disease vaccinating a
smaller number of individuals. SF networks can be con-
sidered as a limiting case of heterogeneous systems and
it is natural to look for specifically devised immunization
strategies.
6A. Proportional immunization
A straightforward way to reintroduce an intrinsic im-
munization threshold in SF networks consists in using
different fractions of immunized individuals according to
their connectivity. Let us define gk as the fraction of
immune individuals with a given connectivity k. If we
impose the condition
λ˜ ≡ λk(1 − gk) = const., (19)
we observe that Eqs. (5) become identical and decoupled,
defining effectively an homogeneous system. The density
of infected individuals is the same for all connectivities
k, and an epidemic threshold λ˜c = 1 is reintroduced in
the system. This condition requires that k(1 − gk) is
constant for all groups of connectivity k at the thresh-
old, implying that gk ∼ 1 − 1/kλ; i.e., a larger portion
of individuals must be immunized in groups with larger
connectivity. In this scheme the total density of immu-
nized individuals can be easily calculated by averaging
gk over the various connectivity classes. The fraction of
non-immunized individuals 1− gk can not be larger than
one, thus we focus only on classes with connectivity such
that the reproductive number k > λ−1. To eradicate
the infection, we need that gk ≥ 1 − 1/kλ in all classes
with connectivity k > λ−1, defining the critical fraction
of immunized individuals as
gc =
∑
k>λ−1
(1−
1
λk
)P (k). (20)
In order to perform an explicit calculation for the BA
model, we use again the continuous k approximation [5].
In this case we obtain that
gc =
1
3
(mλ)2. (21)
This result can be readily extended to SF networks with
arbitrary γ values, and it is worth remarking that this
recipe is along the lines of that introduced in the im-
munization of heterogeneously populated groups [1]. Re-
cently, a similar strategy has been put forward in Ref. [24]
by proposing to cure with proportionally higher rates the
most connected nodes.
B. Targeted immunization
While proportional immunization schemes are effec-
tive in finally introducing an well-defined immunization
threshold, the very peculiar nature of SF networks allows
to define more efficient strategies based on the nodes’ hi-
erarchy. In particular, it has been shown that SF net-
works posses a noticeable resilience to random connec-
tion failures [25, 26, 27], which implies that the network
can resist a high level of damage (disconnected links),
without loosing its global connectivity properties; i.e.,
the possibility to find a connected path between almost
any two nodes in the system. At the same time, SF net-
works are strongly affected by selective damage; if a few
of the most connected nodes are removed, the network
suffers a dramatic reduction of its ability to carry infor-
mation [25, 26, 27]. Applying this argument to the case of
epidemic spreading, we can devise a targeted immuniza-
tion scheme in which we progressively make immune the
most highly connected nodes, i.e., the ones more likely
to spread the disease. While this strategy is the sim-
plest solution to the optimal immunization problem in
heterogeneous populations [1], its efficiency is compara-
ble to the uniform strategies in networks with finite con-
nectivity variance. In SF networks, on the contrary, it
produces an arresting increase of the network tolerance
to infections at the price of a tiny fraction of immune
individuals.
Let us consider the situation in which a fraction g of the
individuals with the highest connectivity are successfully
immunized. This corresponds, in the limit of a large
network, to the introduction an upper threshold kt, such
that all nodes with connectivity k > kt are immune. The
fraction of immunized individuals is then given by
g =
∑
k>kt
P (k), (22)
relation that renders kt an implicit function of g. The
presence of the cut-off kt(g) defines the new average
quantities 〈k〉t =
∑kt
m kP (k) and
〈
k2
〉
t
=
∑kt
m k
2P (k),
which are on their turn function of g. At the same time,
all links emanating from immunized individuals can be
considered as if they were removed. The probability p(g)
that any link will lead to an immunized individual is then
given by
p(g) =
∑
k>kt(g)
kP (k)∑
k kP (k)
, (23)
and if we consider that this fraction p(g) of links are ef-
fectively removed, the new connectivity distribution after
the immunization of a fraction g of the most connected
individuals is [27]:
Pg(k) =
kt∑
q≥k
P (q)
(
q
k
)
(1− p)kpq−k. (24)
The new distribution (after cut-off introduction and link
removal) yields the first two moments 〈k〉g = 〈k〉t (1− p)
and
〈
k2
〉
g
=
〈
k2
〉
t
(1−p)2+〈k〉t p(1−p) [27]. By recalling
Eq. (10), the critical fraction gc of immune individuals
needed to eradicate the infection will be given by the
relation〈
k2
〉
gc
〈k〉gc
≡
〈
k2
〉
t
〈k〉t
(1 − p(gc)) + p(gc) = λ
−1. (25)
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FIG. 3: a) Typical plots of ρg(t) as a function of time, averaged over 100 starting configurations, from computer simulations
of the SIS model in BA networks with uniform immunization for different values of g. From top to bottom: g = 0.1, 0.14, 0.3,
and 0.5. For all values of g shown, the endemic state is reached in a sufficiently large network. b)Typical plots of ρg(t) as a
function of time, averaged over 100 starting configurations, for the SIS model in BA networks with targeted immunization for
different values of g. From top to bottom: g = 0.1, 0.14, and 0.3. For the last value, larger than the critical immunization, all
runs die for any network size.
An explicit calculation for the BA network in the continu-
ous k approximation yields that the density of immunized
nodes is related to the connectivity threshold as
g = 1−
∫ kt
m
P (k)dk = m2k−2t . (26)
By inverting this relation we obtain that the connectivity
threshold is kt = mg
−1/2, yielding that
p(g) =
1
2m
(
1−
∫ kt
m
kP (k)dk
)
= g1/2. (27)
As well, we can obtain 〈k〉t ≃ 2m and
〈
k2
〉
t
≃
2m2 ln(g−1/2) as kt = mg
−1/2 → ∞. By inserting these
values into Eq. (25) we obtain the approximate solution
for the immunization threshold in the case of targeted
immunization as
gc ≃ exp(−2/mλ). (28)
This clearly indicates that the targeted immunization
program is extremely convenient in SF networks where
the critical immunization is exponentially small in a wide
range of spreading rates λ. Also in this case, the present
result can be generalized for SF networks with arbitrary
connectivity exponent γ.
In order to test the targeted immunization scheme we
have implemented numerical simulations of the SIS model
on the WS and BA networks by immunizing the gN
nodes with the highest connectivity. Note that, for a
given network, this method is essentially deterministic:
Once we identify the hierarchy in the node’s connectivity
distribution, we proceed to protect those nodes on top
of the list. Simulations are performed at a fixed spread-
ing rate λ = 0.25. In Fig. 1(a) we report the behavior of
the prevalence of infected nodes for the WS network with
targeted immunization; the results corresponding to the
BA graph are plotted in Fig. 2(a). In the case of the WS
network, the behavior of the prevalence as a function of
g is equivalent in the uniform and targeted immuniza-
tion procedures. The connectivity fluctuations are small,
and the immunization of the most connected nodes is
equivalent to the random choice of immune nodes. This
confirms that targeted strategies do not have a particular
efficiency in systems with limited heterogeneity. On the
contrary, in the case of the BA network, we observe a
drastic variation in the prevalence behavior. In particu-
lar, the prevalence suffers a very sharp drop and exhibits
the onset of an immunization threshold above which no
endemic state is possible (zero infected individuals). A
linear extrapolation from the largest values of g yields
an estimate of the very convenient threshold gc ≃ 0.16.
This definitely shows that SF networks are highly sensi-
tive to the targeted immunization of a small fraction of
the most connected nodes (see Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 3(b)).
While these networks are particularly weak in face of in-
fections, the good news consist in the possibility to devise
immunization strategies which are extremely effective.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The present results indicate that the SF networks’
susceptibility to epidemic spreading is reflected also in
80.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Uniform Immunization
0 0.01
0
0.4
0.8
Targeted Immunization
g

g
=

o
FIG. 4: Reduced prevalence ρg/ρ0 from computer simulations
of the SIS model in a portion of a real Internet map with
uniform (main plot) and targeted (inset) immunization at a
fixed spreading rate λ = 0.25. We only consider values of the
immunization for which almost all the runs survive up to the
end. This explains the short range of values of g shown for
the targeted immunization case.
an intrinsic difficulty in protecting them with local—
uniform—immunization. On a global level, uniform im-
munization policies are not satisfactory and, in analogy
with disease spreading in heterogenous media, only tar-
geted immunization procedures achieve the desired low-
ering of epidemic outbreaks and prevalence. This evi-
dence radically changes the usual perspective of the reg-
ular epidemiological framework. Spreading of infectious
or polluting agents on SF networks, such as food or social
webs, might be contrasted only by a careful choice of the
immunization procedure. In particular, these procedures
should rely on the identification of the most connected in-
dividuals. The protection of just a tiny fraction of these
individuals raises dramatically the tolerance to infections
of the whole population
A practical example is provided by the spreading of
viruses in the Internet [28]. The SF nature of this net-
work is the outcome of a connectivity redundancy which
is very welcome because it ensures a greater error tol-
erance than in less connected networks. On the other
hand, despite the large use of anti-virus software which
is available on the market within days or weeks after the
first virus incident report, the average lifetime of digi-
tal epidemics is impressively large (10-14 months) [16].
Numerical simulations of the SIS model on real maps
of the Internet can provide further support to our pic-
ture. The SIS model is, in fact, well suited to describe
DNS-cache computer viruses [29] (the so-called “natural
computer viruses”), and different digital viruses can be
modeled by considering the random neighbor version of
the model [19]); i.e. infected e-mails can be sent to dif-
ferent nodes which are not nearest neighbors. The map
considered here, provided by the National Laboratory for
Applied Network Research (NLANR) and available at the
web site http://www.moat.nlanr.net/Routing/rawdata/,
contains 6313 nodes and 12362 links, corresponding to
an average connectivity 〈k〉 = 3.92. The connectivity
distribution is scale-free, with a characteristic exponent
γ ≃ 2.2 [12]. Our simulations are performed at a fixed
spreading rate λ = 0.25, averaging over at least 2500
different starting configurations. We implement both
the uniform and the targeted immunization procedures.
The results obtained clearly indicate that the behavior
is completely analogous to that found on the BA net-
work. Fig. 4 illustrates that, while uniform immuniza-
tion does not allow any drastic reduction of the infection
prevalence—the immunization of 25% of the nodes re-
duces by less than a factor 1/2 the relative prevalence—
the targeted immunization drastically removes the oc-
currence of endemic states even at very low value of the
immunization parameter. The fact that SF networks can
be properly secured only by a selective immunization,
points out that an optimized immunization of the Inter-
net can be reached only through a global immunization
organization that secures a small set of selected high-
traffic routers or Internet domains. Unfortunately, the
self-organized nature of the Internet does not allow to
easily figure out how such an organization should oper-
ate.
The present results also appear to have potentially in-
teresting implications in the case of human sexual dis-
ease control [1, 30]. Most sexually transmitted diseases
cannot be characterized without including the noticeable
differences of sexual activity within a given population.
Epidemic modeling is thus based on partitioning popu-
lation groups by the number of sexual partners per unit
time [1]. This implicitly corresponds to the knowledge of
the probability distribution function P (k) that gives the
fraction of the population within the k class. The recent
observation that the web of human sexual contacts ex-
hibits scale-free features [15] points out that also sexually
transmitted diseases are eventually spreading in a net-
work with virtually infinite heterogeneity. It follows that
concepts such as the mean number of sexual partners or
its variance are not good indicators in this case. As well,
the definition of a core group of “super-spreader” individ-
uals could be a non well-defined concept because of the
lack of precisely defined thresholds or characteristic mag-
nitudes in the scale-free distribution of sexual contacts.
Nevertheless, the striking effectiveness of targeted immu-
nization indicates that control and prevention campaigns
should be strongly focused at the most promiscuous indi-
viduals. These represent the most connected nodes of the
network and are thus the key individuals in the spreading
of the infection.
While the simple SIS model is very instructive, many
other ingredients should be considered in a more realistic
representation of real epidemics [1, 2]. One would also
want to add simple rules defining the temporal patterns
9of networks such as the frequency of forming new connec-
tions, the actual length of time that a connection exists,
or different types of connections. These dynamical fea-
tures are highly valuable experimental inputs which are
necessary ingredients in the use of complex networks the-
ory in epidemic modeling.
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